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THE ABSENCE OF THE DIVINE 
 
JACOB COPEMAN & JOHN HAGSTROM 
 
Willerslev and Suhr’s text is a renewed warrant for the methodological recognition that 
anthropologists of religion often experience revelatory, transformative, and disruptive 
events during fieldwork. A catalogue of mystical encounters—resembling what Apter has 
recently dubbed the “ethnographic X-files” (2017, 297)—is provided: for instance, Evans-
Pritchard’s unidentified night- time lights, Bubandt’s disconcerting rooftop dog, Wille slev’s 
prophetic dream, and Suhr’s whispering djinn. It would be easy to list further examples (e.g., 
Desjarlais 1992; Young and Goulet 1994; Jacobs 2002), and it is clear that a widespread 
phenomenon is receiving systematic attention here. As privileged drivers for novel 
anthropological insights, these experiences suffuse the scholarly core of the discipline with 
remarkable and perhaps unique generative force. The primary deficit of Willerslev and 
Suhr’s otherwise excellent article, we will show, is their omission of examples that testify to 
the absence of the divine, felt by both interlocutors and anthropologists. 
 
In certain respects, as the authors point out, their arguments are indebted to earlier calls for 
a dismantling of the disciplinary taboo against a methodological posture of radical 
participation, self-effacement, and existential transformation—frequently glossed as “going 
native” (e.g., Turner 1993; Ewing 1994; Fabian 2000). However, they seize on the significant 
fact that encounters with the divine are often doubt-ridden or even incomprehensible, 
echoing recent critics of the ontological turn (e.g., Graeber 2015), and new anthropological 
scholarship on doubt (e.g., Blanes & Oustinova-Stjepanovic 2015; Pelkmans 2013; Haynes 
forthcoming). In other words, the origin and meaning of disruptive experiences—whether in 
the form of prophetic dreams or manipulative whispers—are at times perceived by 
interlocutors as “inherently unknowable” (Graeber 2015, 28), foreclosing any recourse to 
the stable and coherent ontology implied by the problematic adage of the “native’s point of 
view”. The inexplicable nature of such events, Willerslev and Suhr contend, is an index of 
absolute Kierkegaardian paradoxes, provoking questions that “understanding cannot 
answer,” and producing “a type of existential uncertainty that belongs neither to oneself 
nor to the ethnographic other, but subsumes them both.”  
 
Graeber has suggested that the ethnographic record is probably just as ripe with skepticism 
as it is with revelation, even if it is a kind of doubt that rarely breaks the game: “the aura of 
at least potential disbelief,” as he puts it (2001, 243). Thus, specific hail charms and curers 
can be branded fraudulent, but such scrutiny tends to “leave the main belief in the 
prophetic and therapeutic powers of witch-doctors unimpaired” (Evans-Pritchard [1937] 
1976, 107; see Lévi-Strauss 1963; Taussig [1998] 2016). Of course, there are also examples 
of more thoroughgoing disavowal and detachment (e.g., Radin 1927, 1953; Goody 1996). 
The skepticism that Graeber and others identify is, at least in part, tied to the potential for 
magical failure and ineptitude—as Bialecki puts it, the divine might exist “as much under 
erasure as it does as a presence ethnographically” (2014, 43). The analytical value of taking 
failure seriously is demonstrated by Oustinova-Stjepanovic’s recent study of a Sufi order in 
Macedonia and the felt incapacity of its adherents, in spite of attempts at reflexive self-
discipline, to experience spiritually charged rituals: “‘Why are we so inept?’ (Zashto nas ne 
biva?),” they ask themselves (2017, 338). There are many other examples of spiritual and 
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prophetic deficit (e.g., Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter 1956; Kendall 1996; Laderman 
1996; Lewis 2000; Kravel-Tovi 2009). In line with Graeber’s contention that the critical 
skepticism of interlocutors is often “simply left out of ethnographic accounts” (2015, 11), 
Oustinova-Stjepanovic charts the default conjectures of anthropological theory that 
engender an analytical predilection to “discount failure and ineptitude as an ‘aberration’” 
(2017, 339).  
 
It seems only reasonable to expect that many anthropologists will share the trials and 
shortcomings of their informants. Stoller once proposed that anthropologists of shamanism 
are especially liable to “experience something so extraordinary that they find no reasonable 
explanation” (1984, 93), but it took one anthropologist- turned-practitioner eighteen years 
of San Pedro-fueled ceremonies to finally share the visions of her fellow adherents (Glass-
Coffin 2010). Bialecki’s insightful remarks are again helpful here: “There is a problematic 
aspect to any encounter with divinity; even a theist can acknowledge that contact with the 
divine is in no way guaranteed” (2017, 205). 
 
In fact, there is now a modest body of confessional texts by anthropologists describing their 
own spiritual failures. Morton reflects on “two instances of [his] secular-rationalist 
embarrassment in the presence of divine revelation” (2013, 235): the first occurred during a 
lecture when a Cook Islander student had a vision of Morton being transformed into a 
venerable Aboriginal elder, and the second event took place during his fieldwork in New 
South Wales, when he was chased from a forbidden sacred site by an unseen creature (242). 
He found himself incapable of sharing the sense of mystical depth and revelation expressed 
by his student and informants, citing his “anthropological lack of grace” (245). Kahn, in a 
similar tone, describes himself as a “poster boy for modern secular selfhood,” and reports 
feeling a visceral unease when his interlocutors detail personal incidents of telepathy, 
healing powers, rebirth, or palm-reading—phenomena that he calls “radically other to 
secular experience” (2011, 78). Blanes, reflecting on his fieldwork in Pentecostal churches in 
Lisbon and Madrid as “someone who was unwilling either to ‘go native’ or, on the other 
hand, conceal his atheism” (2006, 225), also describes feelings of anxiety and 
embarrassment when participating in intensive rituals (231). He writes: “In order to ‘live in 
Christ’ I had to be ‘touched by God’—something that is felt in a bodily manner and not 
rationalised but . . . I had felt nothing so far. I hadn’t been anointed by God’s grace” (229). In 
Papua New Guinea, when an Urapmin informant suggested that Robbins was “starting to 
‘receive’ the Holy Spirit,” he strongly protested (2015, 124).  
 
In contrast, Suhr describes an example of djinn pos- session in Denmark, and he reports 
hearing manipulative whispers. Oustinova-Stjepanovic, in a not too dissimilar case, was 
herself diagnosed with possession by a male Sufi dervish in Macedonia, which involved 
“being subjected to manhandling and physical scrutiny during the search for a djinn or spots 
where evil forces could have hit” (2015, 127). Her physical and emotional discomfort during 
the exorcism left little room for Willerslev and Suhr’s appeal to “accept the impossibility of 
understanding the power of God in healing.” Reflecting on her experience, she arrives at the 
crucial insight that what is at stake for many atheist anthropologists is not methodological 
atheism, a strategy she rejects (2015, 115–16). Instead, “dispositional atheism,” deeply felt 
sensory aptitudes or sensibilities, sets the limits of her participation (129). This is a helpful 
way of thinking about the experiences reported by many atheist anthropologists, such as 
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Kahn, Morton, and Blanes—and all of them write against Berger’s (1967) version of 
methodological atheism: for Kahn, it is a violent “ethnocentric exercise” (2011, 82); for 
Blanes, it is inimical to the recognition of spirits (Blanes and Espírito Santo 2014); Bialecki, 
who describes himself as “in effect an atheist,” re-works it to frame God as an agent in the 
world (2014, 33); Morton (2013) favors the cross-pollination of anthropology and theology, 
and, perhaps surprisingly, reads Durkheim as theology; and the list goes on (see Apter 
2017). These accounts give a far more accurate picture of how the anthropology of religion 
looks today compared to what Fortes once wrote about objectivity and reason (1980, vii). 
Willerslev and Suhr argue that Berger’s variant of methodological atheism still occupies the 
position of a guarded doctrine, but it is obvious that there are considerable limits to that 
claim.  
 
What might Willerslev and Suhr’s article tell us about the “return of theology” in 
anthropology? Engelke’s exposition of Philip Blond’s theology is instructive here, not least 
given the fact that Blond was trained by Milbank, the lead advocate for Radical Orthodoxy 
and the author of that lauded title Theology and Social Theory (Milbank 1990), which 
Robbins (2006) introduced as an exemplar to showcase the productive potential of 
theology. “There is no such thing as a secular realm,” writes Blond (1999, 235), “a part of 
the world that can be elevated above God and explained and investigated apart from Him.” 
For all their qualms about the analytical cul-de-sac of humanist models of univocal 
sameness, post-secular theorists are often just as predictable: secularity is reimagined as a 
fraudulent Christian masquerade, reason is faith (or faith’s end, or faith’s origin—dealer’s 
choice), and the notion of a nontheological reality is considered just as preposterous as a 
nonpolitical one (Engelke 2015, 136–37). Once the “secular episteme” is unmasked as “post-
Christian paganism” (Milbank 1990, 280), a project of radical remaking is warranted: “The 
very language of politics, as well as that of culture— and thus the very terms of the secular 
in which they operate—have to be reconfigured at the ontological level” (Engelke 2010). 
This project is mirrored in Fountain’s (2013) call for a remodeled anthropology, or “anthro- 
theology.” But if, as we have shown, secularity is not reducible to intellectual precepts that 
are ostensibly indebted to Christian antecedents, but exists also in the form of dispositions 
and sensibilities, then the “return of theology” demands more than a reconfiguration of 
theoretical languages—it calls for the reconfiguration of selves, or what Willerslev and Suhr 
call a “personal commitment to existential transformation of the self.” The undertaking of 
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